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Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience that one is in control of their
actions and the consequences of these actions. The SoA is a complex phenomenon,
influenced by a weighted combination of various prospective (pre-movement) and
retrospective (post-movement) processes and factors related to action choice, action
selection fluency, action-outcome associations and higher-level inferences. In the
current study, we examined the effect of the congruency between actions and outcomes
in a context where the choice-level of actions was varied from 1 to 4. The actions
consisted of right, left, up and down key presses while the outcomes were visual
representations of the actions (i.e., right, left, up and down-pointing arrowheads).
Participants performed either an instructed action or freely selected an action among
two, three, or four alternatives. Each action randomly produced either a congruent or
an incongruent outcome, depending on the matching between the direction of the key
press and the direction of the outcome arrowhead. Participants estimated the delay
between their actions and the observed outcomes and reported their feeling of control
(FoC) over the outcomes. Interval estimations were used as an indirect measure of the
SoA to quantify the intentional binding effect, which refers to the perceived temporal
attraction between voluntary actions and their outcomes. The results showed that both
intentional binding and FoC were enhanced as the choice-level was increased from
1 to 4. Additionally, intentional binding and FoC over the outcomes were stronger
when actions produced congruent compared to incongruent outcomes. These results
provide additional evidence that both intentional binding and FoC are sensitive to the
number of action alternatives and the congruency between actions and their outcomes.
Importantly, the current study suggests that these prospective and retrospective cues
might independently influence intentional binding and FoC judgments.
Keywords: action choice, outcome congruency, intentional binding, feeling of control, sense of agency
INTRODUCTION
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience that one is in control of their actions
and the consequences of these actions (Gallagher, 2000; Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009; Haggard
and Chambon, 2012). Previous views on the nature of this experience suggested that the SoA can
be experienced at two distinct levels. While the high-level SoA is conceptualized through one’s
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interpretation of their agency, the low-level SoA is experienced
non-conceptually and pre-reflective—similar to what we
experience in our daily routine of actions (Synofzik et al.,
2008a,b).
With respect to the empirical study of the SoA, the high-level
SoA can be quantified by the direct measures that are based on
the subjective judgments of feeling of control (FoC) over the
actions or their corresponding outcomes (Sato and Yasuda, 2005;
Linser and Goschke, 2007; Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Ebert
and Wegner, 2010; Wenke et al., 2010; Barlas and Obhi, 2014).
Indirect measures, on the other hand, have been introduced as
a proxy for the low-level SoA as they do not require conscious
reflection on one’s SoA (Synofzik et al., 2008a; Desantis et al.,
2011; Moore and Obhi, 2012; Barlas and Obhi, 2014). One such
measure is based on the intentional binding phenomenon, which
refers to the perceived temporal attraction between voluntary
actions and their outcomes (Haggard et al., 2002). More clearly,
the temporal interval between actions and outcomes is perceived
as shorter when these outcomes are produced by voluntary
actions compared to when they follow, for instance, involuntary
movements or external causes (Haggard et al., 2002). The
strength of this temporal binding of actions and outcomes is
considered to index the SoA such that stronger binding is
interpreted as stronger SoA (e.g., Engbert et al., 2007; Wenke and
Haggard, 2009; Kühn et al., 2012; Moore and Obhi, 2012). It is
important to note at this point that the relationship among these
measures and their precise relationship with different levels of
the SoA remain far from clear (Dewey and Knoblich, 2014; Saito
et al., 2015). Nonetheless, relevant research conducted in the last
two decades employed these measures extensively to investigate
the mechanisms behind the SoA.
An important outcome of the research on the underlying
mechanisms of the SoA is that SoA is a complex phenomenon,
influenced by a weighted combination of various retrospective
(post-movement) and prospective (pre-movement) processes
(Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Farrer et al., 2013; Synofzik et al.,
2013; Wolpe et al., 2013). Retrospective contributors of the SoA
include the higher level inferences based on the observation
of actions and outcomes (e.g., Wegner and Wheatley, 1999;
Wegner, 2004; Wegner and Sparrow, 2004), causal beliefs
(Desantis et al., 2011, 2012b; Haering and Kiesel, 2012) and
performance monitoring (Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Vuorre
and Metcalfe, 2016).
A relatively recently proposed prospective cue that has
been shown to contribute to the SoA is related to the
processes involved in action selection (Chambon et al., 2014;
Haggard, 2017; Sidarus et al., 2017b). The major components
of action selection processes have thus far been identified as
the source of action selection (i.e., self selected vs. externally
instructed), the number of action alternatives (i.e., the choice
space), and the fluency or the ease of action selection. In
one study, for instance, participants could either freely choose
to harm or not another participant or they performed the
experimenter’s choice of action. Results showed that both
binding and electrophysiological brain activity related to the
processing of auditory outcomes were attenuated in instructed
compared to freely selected actions (Caspar et al., 2016; see
also Sebanz and Lackner, 2007; Borhani et al., 2017; Barlas
et al., 2018). The effect of action choice has also been observed
in the contexts where the number of action alternatives was
varied. More specifically, these studies found that both binding
(Barlas and Obhi, 2013; Barlas et al., 2017) and FoC ratings
(Barlas et al., 2017) are parametrically enhanced as the action
choice space was varied from one to several action alternatives.
Additionally, numerous studies showed that disfluent or effortful
processing of action selection reduced the FoC judgments
(Wenke et al., 2010; Chambon and Haggard, 2012; Chambon
et al., 2013, 2014; Sidarus et al., 2013, 2017a; Sidarus andHaggard,
2016).
Another important mechanism with both prospective and
retrospective components that account for the SoA is based on
the comparator model of motor control processes (Frith et al.,
2000). According to this model, a copy of the motor command
to achieve a specific goal is used by the internal forward models
to generate the predictions towards the sensory outcomes of the
movement (Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert, 1997). Importantly,
these predictions are compared to the actual sensory outcomes
and, in the case of a discrepancy, one can experience a weaker
SoA or attribute the agency to an external agent (Frith et al.,
2000; Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith, 2005). Notably, the entire
process can be considered to have both a prospective and a
retrospective component since the sensorimotor predictions are
produced before the movement and the comparison between the
predicted and actual outcomes is performed after the movement
(Sidarus et al., 2017a).
The role of the matching between predicted and observed
outcomes has been examined in various contexts. Sato and
Yasuda (2005), showed that discrepancies between previously
learned action-outcome associations and actual sensory
consequences can reduce the subjective judgment of control. In
another study, participants were presented with low or high pitch
tones (i.e., auditory primes) before they performed voluntary
or involuntary movements (Moore et al., 2009). Critically, the
pitch of these primes could be either congruent or incongruent
with the actual auditory outcomes, and participants estimated
the temporal delay between their movements and the ensuing
auditory outcomes. It was found that interval estimations were
shorter (i.e., stronger binding) in voluntary than involuntary
movements and when the primes were congruent with the
outcomes than when they were incongruent. Moreover, the
influence of prime compatibility was stronger in the involuntary
condition compared to the voluntary condition.
Ebert and Wegner (2010) provided additional evidence for
stronger SoA when actions and outcomes were congruent.
In their study, participants performed one of two actions
(pulling or pushing a joystick) which caused the object on the
screen to move either away from or closer to the participant.
Participants estimated the delay between their action and the
object’s movement as well as their perceived authorship over
the object’s movements. The results indicated that both binding
and perceived authorship were stronger when the direction of
the object’s movement was congruent with the movement of
the joystick compared to when it was incongruent. In another
study, Farrer et al. (2008) manipulated the sensory feedback
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of the participants’ movements such that the observed virtual
feedback of their movements was modified by varying degrees
of spatial perturbation or temporal delay. Participants judged
whether the observed movements corresponded to their exact
or modified movement or were controlled by the experimenter.
The results suggested that at high spatial deviations, participants
attributed the observed movements to the experimenter while
at medium spatial deviations as well as at medium and high
temporal delays they recognized the observed movements as
their own but modified movements. These results suggested
that spatial and temporal sensory feedback can introduce
different effects on the judgment of the source of observed
actions.
Other studies, however, showed that the relationship
between action-outcome congruency and the SoA—specifically
intentional binding—may not be straightforward. In a series
of experiments, Haering and Kiesel (2014) examined whether
intentional binding depended on the validity of action-effect
mappings. In their study, left and right key presses produced
congruent outcomes (e.g., red and blue squares, respectively) in
80% of the trials while for the remaining trials, these actions
produced incongruent outcomes (Experiment 1). Experiment
2 included a learning session and Experiment 3 rendered the
probability of congruent outcomes as %100 and 50% in separate
blocks. Overall results suggested that the predictability of the
outcomes or the congruency between actions and their outcomes
did not influence intentional binding (see also Desantis et al.,
2012a).
Overall, above-mentioned studies examining the influence
of action-outcome congruency on direct and indirect measures
of the SoA suggested that congruent action-outcomes enhance
the FoC while the effect of outcome congruency on intentional
binding is less clear. In the current study, we aimed to investigate
the influence of outcome congruency on both intentional binding
and FoC judgments—as the indirect and direct measures of
the SoA, respectively—in a context where both action choice-
level and action-outcome congruency were manipulated. More
clearly, the choice-level in the present study was varied from
one to four alternatives (right, left, up and down key presses) and
each of these actions could randomly (with a 50% probability)
produce a congruent or an incongruent visual outcome. After
a left key press, for instance, the congruent outcome would
be the display of a left-pointing arrowhead. An incongruent
outcome, on the other hand, could be the display of any of
the right-, up- or down-pointing arrowheads. The outcomes,
therefore, consisted of highly depictive representations of the
actions, albeit occurred either congruently or incongruently
with the preceding actions. On one view, this could render the
relationship between actions and outcomes more ‘‘meaningful’’
(Haering and Kiesel, 2014) similar to the action-effect association
used in Ebert andWegner (2010). We measured both intentional
binding using the interval estimation procedure (Engbert et al.,
2008; Ebert andWegner, 2010;Moore andHaggard, 2010; Caspar
et al., 2015; Barlas et al., 2017) and FoC judgments over the
outcomes.
Based on the previous findings, our prediction towards
the effect of choice-level was that both binding and FoC
ratings would be systematically enhanced with increased choice-
level (Barlas et al., 2017). Regarding the effect of outcome
congruency, we expected to find greater FoC when outcomes
were congruent with the performed actions compared to when
they were incongruent (Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Ebert and
Wegner, 2010). The similarity between the nature of the action-
outcome relationships (i.e., the perceptual resemblance between
actions and outcomes) used in the current study and in the study
of Ebert and Wegner (2010) led us to expect stronger binding
with congruent compared to incongruent outcomes.
A secondary goal of the current study was to examine whether
the prospective signal of choice-level (Barlas and Obhi, 2013;
Barlas et al., 2017) and the retrospectively determined outcome
congruency would independently affect intentional binding and
FoC judgments. The optimal cue integration approach suggests
that the SoA is modulated by a weighted combination of
prospective and retrospective cues depending on the reliability
of each cue present in a specific context (e.g., Moore et al.,
2009; Moore and Fletcher, 2012). Based on this view, we
conjectured that the effect of choice-level could be stronger
when outcomes are incongruent compared to when they are
congruent. Additionally, we expected that congruent outcomes
would enhance the SoAmore strongly when participants perform
instructed actions (i.e., one-choice condition) compared to when
they freely select among higher number of alternatives.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sample size was determined a priori using GPower 3.1 (Faul
et al., 2009), which suggested 22 participants to obtain a
significant effect of choice-level (effect size = 0.40 (Barlas et al.,
2017), alpha = 0.05, power = 0.95). We recruited slightly more
participants as the a priori power analyses did not account for the
effect of outcome congruency. In total thus, 24 participants from
Bielefeld University (14 males, 2 left-handed,Mage = 24.71 years,
SD = 2.59 years) took part in the study. Participant exclusion
criterion (see below), however, resulted in the exclusion of
2 participants and thus the data of 22 participants (12 males,
2 left-handed,Mage = 24.73 years, SD = 2.60 years) were subjected
to the analyses. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and had no hearing problems. Participants
gave their consent prior to the study and received monetary
compensation (10 Euros) in exchange for their participation. The
study was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of
the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Research
Ethics Board of Bielefeld University.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment was developed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007,
2008) and run on a Dell personal computer (3.07 GHz).
Participants were seated approximately 50 cm away from a
20-inch monitor (resolution: 1600 × 1200) and all stimuli were
presented on awhite background. Key press responses weremade
on a 5-key response pad using the left hand’s index finger. On
this pad, four keys surrounding the central key were marked
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the experimental conditions (upper panel) and
procedure (lower panel) in interval estimation and feeling of control (FoC) tasks.
with right, left, up and down arrowhead images. An optical wheel
mouse was used to indicate responses on the interval estimation
and FoC rating scales presented on the screen. The interval
estimation scale was ranged from 1 ms to 1000 ms and marked
at 50 ms intervals while the FoC scale was a 6-point Likert scale
marked at 0.5-point intervals (1: low control; 6: high control).
Both scales occupied 1000 pixels on the screen and the horizontal
axis position of the mouse cursor after the click (at pixel-
precision) was used for the conversion to the corresponding scale
value (i.e., between 1–1000 ms for the interval estimation scale
and between 1–6 for the FoC rating scale).
Target stimuli consisted of images of a blank square
surrounded by arrowheads that varied in number and
combination (see Figure 1). The images of arrowheads depicted
the alternative actions on the response pad. For each trial,
outcome visual stimuli were the same as the target stimuli except
for the addition that the central square included one of four
arrowheads (randomly determined for each trial). Outcome
visual stimuli was presented simultaneously with a short beep
sound (100 ms, 1000 Hz) that was delivered at 60 dB through the
headphones.
Procedure
Participants were first familiarized with the task and the stimuli
and completed 15 practice trials. Practice session was followed by
a 288-trial block of interval estimation task and a 96-trial block
of FoC rating task. In each block, choice-level (one, two, three,
four), outcome congruency (congruent, incongruent) and delay
(100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms; for the interval estimation task only)
were presented equiprobably in a mixed and random order. After
the completion of each 48 trials, the experiment paused for the
participants to take a short break and participants pressed any
key to resume the experiment when they were ready.
Each trial in the interval estimation session began with
a 750 ms presentation of a signal ‘‘Ready!’’, in response to
which participants were told to rest their left index finger
on the central key. A fixation cross was then presented for
500 ms and followed by the target image which remained on
the screen until a key press response was given. The target
image was a blank square surrounded by one-to-four arrowheads
(left-, right, up- or down-pointing) depending on the choice-
level in a specific trial. Except for the one-choice condition,
participants were told to make a free selection among the
options they were presented with. They were also advised
to avoid giving stereotyped responses but regard each trial
on its own in the free-choice conditions. In the one-choice
condition, they had no choice but were to press the instructed
key. The two- and three-choice conditions included all possible
combinations selected among the four options. Participants
were told to respond as fast as possible and in case of an
erroneous key press that could occur in one-, two- and three-
choice conditions, a warning message was presented (‘‘Incorrect
key press, please pay attention’’) and the trial ended without
presenting the action-outcome. A valid response was followed
by the outcome stimulus presented after one of three delays
(100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms). The outcome image was presented
simultaneously with a beep sound and remained on the screen
for 500 ms. Participants were told that key press-tone intervals
would be determined randomly in each trial and could not
exceed 1000 ms. At the end of each trial, the interval estimation
scale was presented on the screen and participants were to
indicate their estimation of the delay between their key press
and the change in the central square. They did so by moving
the mouse cursor along the scale with their right hand. Inter-
trial interval was set to 500 ms during which a blank screen was
presented.
Trial procedure in the FoC rating block was the same as
in the interval estimation block with the following exceptions.
First, the action-outcome delay was set fixed at 100 ms as
the influence of this delay on FoC judgments was not of
interest for the current study. Second, at the end of each
trial, participants rated on a 6-point Likert scale (1: the lowest
level of control; 6: the highest level of control) presented
on the screen to indicate the degree of control they felt
over the change occurred in the central square. Again,
they used their right hand to move the cursor along the
scale.
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed
about the goal of the study and compensated for their time.
Data Processing
Raw Data Outlier Exclusion
Trials with RTs or interval estimations being three standard
deviations away from themean, or those with incorrect responses
(pressing the wrong key in all but four-choice condition) were
excluded (Mexcluded = 1.76%, SD = 0.74% of all trials).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 137
Barlas and Kopp Action Choice and Outcome Congruency
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations of interval estimations (ms) in each choice-level, outcome-congruency and actual delay condition.
Delay 100 ms 300 ms 500 ms
Outcome congruency Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Choice-level
One 206 (±93) 235 (±99) 439 (±106) 433 (±106) 637 (±135) 639 (±133)
Two 233 (±104) 234 (±108) 415 (±89) 433 (±75) 596 (±137) 602 (±113)
Three 230 (±101) 238 (±107) 393 (±98) 431 (±108) 592 (±109) 590 (±130)
Four 226 (±109) 229 (±104) 402 (±102) 404 (±93) 592 (±120) 589 (±152)
FIGURE 2 | Mean interval estimations as a function of choice-level (A) and outcome congruency (B). Interval estimations were significantly reduced with increasing
choice-level (p < 0.001) and were greater for incongruent compared to congruent outcomes (∗p = 0.047). The interval estimates were averaged across all three
intervals (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Participant Exclusion
Participant exclusion criteria were the proportion of excluded
trials being greater than 20% or failing to demonstrate a
significant trend of gradual increase in the estimations of 100 ms,
300 ms and 500 ms. For the latter criterion, we conducted
linear trend analysis for each participant and found that two
participants did not show a significant trend across the actual
action-outcome intervals (Caspar et al., 2016). Data of these
two participants thus were excluded from the following data
analyses.
RESULTS
Data analyses were conducted using SPSS 24 and the significance
level was set to 0.05. We reported the analysis of variance
(ANOVA) tests using Greenhouse-Geisser correction where
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated.
Interval Estimations
Mean interval estimations for each condition are shown in
Table 1. In order to examine the effects of choice-level and
outcome congruency, we conducted a 4 × 2 × 3 repeated
measures ANOVA with choice-level (one, two, three, four),
congruency (congruent, incongruent) and delay (100 ms,
300 ms, 500 ms) as within-subjects factors. The analysis
yielded significant main effects of choice-level (F(3,63) = 6.01,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.22), outcome congruency (F(1,21) = 4.64,
p = 0.047, η2p = 0.17) and delay (F(2,42) = 129.17, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.86). Additionally, we found a significant interaction
between choice-level and delay (F(6,126) = 5.51, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.21). The interaction between choice-level and congruency
and the remaining interactions were not significant (Fs < 1.13,
ps> 0.349).
We were interested in whether interval estimations were
reduced across one-, two, three- and four-choice conditions. We
thus focused on the contrast analysis1 (Hervé and Williams,
2010), which indicated that there was a significant linear
relationship between choice-level and interval estimations
(F(1,21) = 11.42, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.35), such that interval
estimations were reduced from one- to four-choice conditions
(see Figure 2A, Mchoice-1 = 432, SDchoice-1 = 84; Mchoice-2 = 419,
SDchoice-2 = 76; Mchoice-3 = 413, SDchoice-3 = 82; Mchoice-4 = 407,
SDchoice-4 = 87). The main effect of outcome congruency
suggested that interval estimations were shorter when outcomes
were congruent (Mcongruent = 413, SDcongruent = 81) compared to
when they were incongruent (see Figure 2B, Mincongruent = 421,
SDincongruent = 81).
Finally, we examined the choice-level × delay interaction
further by conducting repeated measures ANOVAs for each
delay. Accordingly, the main effect of choice-level at 100 ms
1We set the coefficients as 3, 1, −1, −3 for one, two, three and four choice
levels, respectively.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 137
Barlas and Kopp Action Choice and Outcome Congruency
TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations of FoC ratings in each choice-level and
outcome-congruency condition.
Outcome congruency Congruent Incongruent
Choice-level
One 4.16 (±1.35) 2.50 (±1.18)
Two 4.24 (±0.90) 2.76 (±1.00)
Three 4.48 (±0.90) 2.92 (±0.87)
Four 4.72 (±1.21) 3.02 (±1.05)
was not significant (F < 0.1, p > 0.5). At both 300 ms and
500 ms, however, the analyses yielded a significant main effect
of choice-level (F(3,63) = 5.04, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.19; F(3,63) = 13.47,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.39, respectively for 300 ms and 500 ms) and
contrast analysis showed that the linear trend was significant at
both delays (F(1,21) = 10.77, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.34; F(1,21) = 22.35,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.39, respectively for 300 ms and 500 ms).
FoC Ratings
As shown in Table 2, FoC ratings were gradually increased with
increased choice-level (Mchoice-1 = 3.32, SDchoice-1 = 0.93;
Mchoice-2 = 3.50, SDchoice-2 = 0.70; Mchoice-3 = 3.70,
SDchoice-3 = 0.66; Mchoice-4 = 3.87, SDchoice-4 = 0.84) and were
higher for congruent (Mcongruent = 4.40, SDcongruent = 0.94) than
incongruent (Mincongruent = 2.80, SDincongruent = 0.94) outcomes
(see Figures 3A,B). We conducted a 4 × 2 repeated measures
ANOVAwith choice-level (one, two, three, four) and congruency
(congruent, incongruent) as within subjects factors. The test
revealed significant main effects of choice-level (F(3,63) = 4.80,
p = 0.026, η2p = 0.19) and congruency (F(1,21) = 32.88, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.61). We also found a significant linear trend in FoC
ratings with increased choice-level (F(1,21) = 5.69, p = 0.027,
η2p = 0.21). The interaction between choice-level and congruency
was not significant (F < 0.1, p> 0.7).
RTs
Mean RTs for each condition are shown in Table 3. We examined
the RTs by a 4 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA with choice-
level (one, two, three, four) and key (right, left, up, down)
as within subjects factors. The test revealed a significant main
effect of key (F(3,60) = 3.49, p = 0.038, η2p = 0.15) while
the main effect of choice-level and the interaction between
choice-level and key were non-significant (Fs < 1.6, ps > 0.2).
Post hoc multiple comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) indicated
that RTs were significantly faster when pressing the right
key (Mright = 506, SDright = 137) compared to the up key
(Mup = 546, SDup = 128, p = 0.037). Remaining differences
were not significant (Mleft = 510, SDleft = 147; Mdown = 526,
SDdown = 126; ps> 0.1).
Key Selection Frequency in the
Multiple-Choice Conditions
We calculated the mean proportions of selecting right, left, up
and down keys across all but one-choice condition (Mright = 0.29,
SDright = 0.07; Mleft = 0.29, SDleft = 0.10; Mup = 0.20,
FIGURE 3 | Mean FoC ratings as a function of choice-level (A) and outcome congruency (B). FoC ratings were significantly increased with increasing choice-level
(p = 0.027) and were higher for congruent compared to incongruent outcomes (∗p < 0.001). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations of RTs (ms) in each choice-level for each key.
Key Right Left Up Down
Choice-level
One 492 (±107) 500 (±124) 527 (±95) 525 (±102) 511 (±107)
Two 505 (±125) 517 (±160) 550 (±125) 528 (±115) 525 (±131)
Three 514 (±165) 518 (±145) 553 (±126) 534 (±153) 530 (±147)
Four 514 (±151) 503 (±159) 555 (±164) 516 (±135) 522 (±152)
506 (±137) 510 (±147) 546 (±128) 526 (±126) Overall
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SDup = 0.09; Mdown = 0.22, SDdown = 0.11) and conducted six
paired-samples t-tests (Bonferroni corrected alpha = 0.008). The
tests demonstrated that none of the differences was significant
(ps> 0.008).
DISCUSSION
Previous research showed that the subjective judgment of control
is enhanced when observed outcomes are congruent with the
expected outcomes (Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Ebert and Wegner,
2010). However, the results regarding the effect of outcome
congruency on intentional binding are rather mixed. While
some studies showed that binding is stronger with congruent
compared to incongruent outcomes (Moore et al., 2009; Ebert
and Wegner, 2010), others have reported that action-outcome
congruency did not affect intentional binding (Haering and
Kiesel, 2014). In the current study, we examined the effect
of outcome congruency on both intentional binding and FoC
judgments in a context where the action choice-level was
varied from one to four and action-outcome congruency was
retrospectively determined.
To begin with, we found that intentional binding and FoC
were similarly enhanced as the choice-level was increased from
one to four alternatives. This finding is consistent with the results
of the previous studies that examined the influence of choice-
level on intentional binding and FoC judgments (Barlas and
Obhi, 2013; Barlas et al., 2017) and confirms the view that greater
self involvement in action selection can play an important role
in the SoA (Sebanz and Lackner, 2007; Haggard, 2008; Caspar
et al., 2016; Barlas et al., 2018, 2017) and lends further support
to the view that processes involved during action selection can
prospectively influence the SoA (Chambon et al., 2014; Haggard,
2017; Sidarus et al., 2017b).
More critically, we found that congruent outcomes led to
stronger intentional binding and higher FoC ratings compared
to incongruent outcomes. The finding that FoC is stronger when
outcomes occur congruently with their corresponding actions
has been consistently demonstrated by previous research (e.g.,
Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Ebert and Wegner, 2010). Although
the effect of outcome congruency we found on intentional
binding is also in line with the findings of Moore et al.
(2009) and Ebert and Wegner (2010), it stands contradictory
to the other findings showing that binding is insensitive
to the congruency between actions and outcomes (Desantis
et al., 2012a; Haering and Kiesel, 2014). We believe that
the methodological differences and the characteristics of the
action-outcome associations might account for the divergent
results. In the study by Haering and Kiesel (2014), for instance,
the probability of an action producing a consistent outcome
was 80% and thus outcome identity was highly predictable
(Experiment 1) and highly congruent with the previously learned
action-outcome mappings (Experiment 2). Although the authors
varied this probability as 100% and 50% in separate blocks in
Experiment 3, this experiment examined the effect of whether
outcome identity could be predicted (100% condition) or not
(50% condition) rather than the effect of the congruency
between actions and outcomes as they did in Experiments 1
and 2. In the current study, however, the probability of a
congruent or an incongruent outcome to occur was kept at
50% and thus the outcome congruency was unpredictable. As
such, we could directly examine the effect of retrospectively
determined outcome congruency on intentional binding and
FoC judgments.
Another important detail in the methodology of the current
study is related to the characteristic of the action-outcome
associations. That is, actions in the current study were right,
left, up and down key presses and the direction of these
keys were visually depicted by the outcomes. These actions
and outcomes thus shared a perceptual resemblance. Similarly,
in Ebert and Wegner (2010), the movement of the objects
on the screen was either in the same or opposite direction
of the performed actions. In contrast, the study by Haering
and Kiesel (2014) included colored squares or auditory tones
as the action-outcomes, which could be considered as more
arbitrary to their corresponding left/right key press actions. As
contended by Haering and Kiesel (2014), thus, the effect of
outcome congruency on binding could depend on the existence
of a meaningful relationship between actions and outcomes.
However, this view requires further examination to clarify, for
instance, the extent of learning and experience required to
establish a meaningful relationship between irrelevant actions
and outcomes such that the violation of this association can affect
binding.
Notwithstanding with the previously reported contradictory
results, our finding regarding the effect of outcome congruency
on both intentional binding and FoC can be interpreted
in light of the ideomotor theory (James, 1890; Elsner and
Hommel, 2001; Hommel et al., 2001, 2003; Hoffmann, 2003)
and the comparator model (Frith et al., 2000). According to
the ideomotor principle, the acquisition of action-outcome
associations through substantial learning can lead to the
bidirectional activation of actions and outcomes. That is,
selection of a specific action can activate the associated outcome
and perception of an outcome can activate the corresponding
action representation. Although the current study did not include
a learning phase for the acquisition of four action-outcome
associations, the visual similarities between the representations
of actions and outcomes could have led to an automatic
action-outcome association. Thus, the representations of possible
actions/outcomes observed in the target stimuli could trigger
both the selection of an action and the corresponding action-
outcome association. Based on this, it is reasonable to suggest
that the congruency between the pre-activated action-outcome
associations and the observed outcomes resulted in stronger
intentional binding and FoC. Additionally, previouslymentioned
internal forward models that produce the anticipations towards
the sensory outcomes of actions could also address the current
results. In this regard, the forward models would produce, for
instance, a right-pointing arrowhead once a right key press
is selected. The retrospective comparison of this prediction to
the actual outcome could then result in enhanced intentional
binding and stronger FoC in the case of congruent compared
to incongruent outcomes (Frith et al., 2000; Blakemore et al.,
2002; Frith, 2005). At this point, the presumed roles of
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forward model and the ideomotor theory might seem quite
similar in how they address the SoA. However, it should be
noted that ideomotor theory focuses more strongly on the
selection of an action while the comparator model emphasizes
the predictions towards the outcomes once an action is
selected (for an extensive discussion on this see Hommel,
2015).
A critical question we sought to investigate was whether
choice-level and outcome congruency would independently or
interactively influence intentional binding and FoC judgments.
In contrast to our predictions, our results supported the
former possibility. That is, increased choice-level enhanced
both binding and FoC independent of the congruency of
outcomes and congruent outcomes led to stronger binding and
FoC regardless of the number of action alternatives. Previous
research examining the effect of predictive and retrospective
cues in the same context found that when predictive cues
are absent (Moore et al., 2009) or when actions produce
outcomes at a low probability (Moore and Haggard, 2008),
the SoA relies more strongly on the retrospective cues. These
findings are in line with the optimal cue integration view
which suggests that the effects of prospective and retrospective
cues on the SoA are differentially weighted depending on
their reliability in a specific context (Synofzik et al., 2009;
Moore and Fletcher, 2012). In a previous study, Sidarus et al.
(2013) examined the effect of action selection fluency on
FoC judgments when the probability of actions producing
predicted effects was 67%. Additionally, actions were preceded
by either compatible or incompatible primes as in the
previous studies examining selection fluency effect on the FoC
judgments (e.g., Wenke et al., 2010; Chambon and Haggard,
2012). Their results showed that FoC was stronger over the
expected compared to unexpected outcomes and when action
primes were compatible than when they were incompatible.
Moreover, the interaction between outcome expectancy and
prime compatibility suggested that compatible primes enhanced
the FoC more strongly for unexpected than expected outcomes.
And expected outcomes enhanced the FoC more strongly when
primes were incompatible than when they were compatible.
We had therefore predicted that in the current study, the
effect of choice-level would be stronger when actions produced
incongruent compared to congruent outcomes. Inconsistent
with this prediction, however, we found that choice-level
and outcome congruency independently influenced binding
and FoC. Although for the moment we cannot determine
why an interaction between these factors was not observed
as predicted, our findings provide distinct evidence that
choice-level as prospective cue and outcome congruency as a
retrospective cue can have independent effects on intentional
binding and FoC judgments. One speculation we could propose
is that choice-level and outcome congruency cues provided
equiprobable reliability to the measures of the SoA we employed
here, since the appearance of each choice and congruency
condition in the current experiment was unpredictable to the
participants.
One limitation of the current study is that we did not
manipulate the relatedness of the outcomes to their actions.
Future studies should contrast meaningful and arbitrary
outcomes in the same experimental context and examine the
outcome congruency effect on intentional binding. A further
potential direction for future studies could be to determine
whether substantial learning and experience with arbitrarily
linked actions and outcomes could mediate the effect of outcome
congruency on intentional binding. Another limitation of the
present study is that we obtained interval estimations and FoC
ratings in separate blocks, which precluded the examination
of the relationship between intentional binding and FoC
ratings. Although our rationale was to avoid any potential
contamination between these two measures, it remains for the
future work to directly examine the link between direct and
indirect measures of the SoA. Finally, an interesting question
that future work should address is whether motor preparation
processes and movement parameters would be influenced by
the number of action alternatives and outcome predictability.
Examination of the readiness potential (Shibasaki and Hallett,
2006) and electromyography in the context of selecting one
of several action alternatives that produce either predicted or
unpredicted outcomes could provide valuable insight into this
question.
To conclude, our investigation of the effects of choice-level
and outcome congruency on the SoA, measured by intentional
binding and FoC judgments, provided several important
findings. First, we confirmed the previous findings that both
intentional binding and FoC were enhanced with increased
choice-level, suggesting that the degree of self-involvement in
action selection is an important contributor to the SoA. Second,
we provided additional evidence that both intentional binding
and FoC were stronger for congruent compared to incongruent
outcomes. Moreover, we found that choice-level and outcome
congruency independently influenced intentional binding and
FoC judgments. We believe that these findings provide further
insight into the relatively less examined questions related to the
effects of concurrently present prospective and retrospective cues
on the direct and indirect measures of the SoA.
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